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 Abstract 
Earnings inequality in the United States has increased rapidly over the last three decades, but little is 
known about the role of firms in this trend. For example, how much of the rise in earnings inequality 
can be attributed to rising dispersion between firms in the average wages they pay, and how much is 
due to rising wage dispersion among workers within firms? Similarly, how did rising inequality affect 
the wage earnings of different types of workers working for the same employer—men vs. women, 
young vs. old, new hires vs. senior employees, and so on? To address questions like these, we begin 
by constructing a matched employer-employee data set for the United States using administrative 
records. Covering all U.S. firms between 1978 to 2012, we show that virtually all of the rise in 
earnings dispersion between workers is accounted for by increasing dispersion in average wages paid 
by the employers of these individuals. In contrast, pay differences within employers have remained 
virtually unchanged, a finding that is robust across industries, geographical regions, and firm size 
groups. Furthermore, the wage gap between the most highly paid employees within these firms (CEOs 
and high level executives) and the average employee has increased only by a small amount, refuting 
oft-made claims that such widening gaps account for a large fraction of rising inequality in the 
population. 
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1 Introduction
The dramatic rise in U.S. wage inequality since the 1970s has been well documented.
An enormous body of theoretical and empirical research has been conducted over the
past two decades in an attempt to understand the causes of this trend.1 While much
has been learned from these analyses, several major questions remain unanswered.
An important set of open questions concerns the link between wage inequality on the
worker side to trends in the behavior of the firms and industries that employ these
workers. A major diﬃculty with studying questions of this sort has been the lack of a
comprehensive, matched employer-employee data set in the United States that covers
the period of rising inequality, beginning with the 1970s.
In the absence of comprehensive evidence on wages paid by firms, it is frequently
asserted that inequality within the firm is a driving force leading to an increase in
overall inequality. For example, according to Mishel and Sabadish (2014), “a key driver
of wage inequality is the growth of chief executive oﬃcer earnings and compensation.”
Piketty (2013) (p. 315) agrees, noting that “the primary reason for increased income
inequality in recent decades is the rise of the supermanager.” And he adds (p. 332)
that “wage inequalities increased rapidly in the United States and Britain because
U.S. and British corporations became much more tolerant of extremely generous pay
packages after 1970.”
To help address these questions, we use data on wage earnings for a one-sixteenth
percent representative sample of U.S. workers, and the (100 percent) population of
U.S. firms, between 1978 and 2012. Wage earnings in this data set have no top-coding,
which allows us to study individuals at the top of the earnings distributions. Because
it is based on administrative records, there is little measurement error, which is a
pervasive problem in survey-based data. Additionally, because of the large sample
size, we are able to obtain precise estimates using nonparametric methods.
Contrary to the assertions made by Mishel and Sabadish (2014), Piketty (2013),
and others, we find strong evidence that within-firm pay inequality has remained
1For the basic facts about these trends, see, among others, Juhn et al. (1993a) and Autor et al.
(2008), and for a survey of theoretical work, see, e.g., Acemoglu (2002) and Acemoglu and Autor
(2011).
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mostly flat over the past three decades. Between 1982 and 2012, the middle of the
income distribution saw an increase in real wages of 18 log points (20 percent), while
the top one percent saw an increase of 66 log points (94 percent). This change is
roughly mirrored in their firms: individuals in the middle of the income distribution
worked at firms with mean real wages 23 log points (25 percent) higher in 2012 than
in 1982, but individuals in the top one percent worked at firms with mean real wages
72 log points (105 percent) higher. If we calculate the increase in individual inequality
during that time period as the diﬀerence between the change at the top end with the
change at the middle—a 48 log point diﬀerence—then virtually all of that increasing
individual inequality is explained by the 49 log point diﬀerence between the firms of
individuals at the top, versus firms of individuals in the middle. These trends are
consistent across regions and industries, remain true when restricting by sex, age, and
tenure, and are robust to various changes to the sample selection criteria.
There are several potential explanations for these findings. One possibility is
increased sorting: that is, perhaps, in the 1980s firms were employing workers from
a broader set of skill levels but have become increasingly specialized over time, so
that now firms employ workers from narrower skills groups. Therefore, some firms
pay much higher average wages than before because their average worker quality has
increased. And vice versa for firms that are now paying lower than before.2
A second potential explanation (which is not necessarily mutually exclusive with
the first one) is growing productivity diﬀerentials across firms. If the production tech-
nology delivers positive assortative matching and workers are mobile and then higher
skill workers will flock into higher productivity firms (and vice versa for low produc-
tivity firms and lower skill workers). Therefore, increased productivity diﬀerences
could trigger increased sorting. However, this productivity diﬀerential channel does
not require sorting to work. If instead workers have strong attachments to their firms
(perhaps due to firm-specific human capital), then workers will not reallocate across
firms and their wage will reflect the diverging productivity levels across firms.
The evidence established above does not directly distinguish between these diﬀer-
2Although this is a plausible hypothesis that can explain some of the rise in between-firm in-
equality, it seems that for this channel to generate the bulk of the rise it would require a substantial
reorganization of firms during this period.
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ent hypotheses. It is possible to use a regression framework to distinguish between
these hypotheses, along the lines of Card et al. (2013), which is part of our ongoing
research. (The paper will be updated with these new results once available).
More broadly, however, our results stress that any explanation for rising inequality
must take into account an understanding of the nature of the firm and the economic
motivations that led to its boundaries. They also suggest an explanation for why many
do not feel that there has been an increase in inequality:3 on average, individuals’
inequality with their coworkers has changed little over the past three decades.
Several recent studies have attempted to answer similar questions. Abowd et al.
(1999) employ a regression framework that allows them to disentangle firm eﬀects,
worker eﬀects, and the nature of sorting by studying a longitudinal panel of French
workers and firms. They find that firm eﬀects, while important, are less important
than individual eﬀects. Card et al. (2013) use a similar technique to analyze a question
more similar to ours: Using a matched employer-employee panel data set from West
Germany, they find that increasing inequality is approximately equally explained by
increased heterogeneity between workers, increasing heterogeneity between establish-
ments, and increasing assortative matches between the two. Mueller et al. (2015)
relate rising inequality to firm growth in the United Kingdom, finding that wages for
high-skill jobs are diverging from wages for other jobs more at large firms than smaller
firms, while the diﬀerential between wages for medium- and low-skill jobs is mostly
unrelated to firm size. They also find evidence that rising inequality in developed
countries may be driven by an increase in size of the largest firms.
Dunne et al. (2004) was the first paper to draw attention to the fact that rising
inequality among workers was closely mirrored in rising inequality among (plants)
establishments. However, these authors lacked data on wages within firms, which
limited the scope of their analysis to between-firm data. Faggio et al. (2007) also
found a similar link between rising worker and firm inequality in a sample of UK firms,
particularly in the service sector, but again lacked a matched worker-firm database.
Closest to our work, Barth et al. (2014) use the Longitudinal Employer-Household
3One indicator of this is that the rise in inequality had mostly occurred by the early 2000s while
the popular press did not focus on this unless the late 2000s , after the increased availability of data
on income inequality.
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Dynamics data spanning 1992 to 2007 as a source of U.S. employer-employee matched
data. They also find a large share (about 2/3 in their analysis) of the rise in earnings
inequality can be attributed to the rise in between-establishment inequality, but unlike
our work they find an important role for cross-industry variation. One key diﬀerence
between this study and our paper is that we focus on the population of firms as
the measure of employer—identified by Employer Identification Numbers (EINs)—as
opposed to establishments (plants) in these studies. This is important as it allows
us to study a variety of questions about pay structure within the firm, including in
corporate headquarters. Second, our data is not top-coded which allows us to examine
CEOs and other executive pay, since we can look at divisions up to the top 99.99%.
Finally, Barth et al. (2014)’s LEHD data analysis covers the 16 year period 1992–2007
while our data set spans 35 years from 1978 to 2012, including the Great Recession.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set and the con-
struction of the matched employer-employee data set, presents summary statistics
from the sample, and discusses the methodology. Section 3 presents the main results
and Section 4 concludes.
2 Empirical Analysis
2.1 Data and Sample Selection
The main source of data used in this paper is the confidential Master Earnings File
(MEF), which is compiled and maintained by the U.S. Social Security Administration
(SSA). The MEF has previously been used in Guvenen et al. (2014b), which contains
a more detailed description of the data set as well as the steps of the sample selection.
Therefore, here we provide a brief overview and refer the reader to that paper for
more details.
The MEF contains a separate line of record for every individual that has ever been
issued a Social Security Number. In addition to basic demographic information (sex,
race, place of birth, date of birth, etc.), the MEF contains labor earnings information
for every year from 1978 to 2012. Earnings data in the MEF is based on Box 1 of Form
5
W-2, which is sent directly from employers to the SSA. Data from Box 1 is uncapped,
and includes wages and salaries, bonuses, exercised stock options, the dollar value of
vested restricted stock units, and other sources of income.
The Matched Employer-Employee Dataset
Because earnings data are based on the W-2 form, the data set includes one record for
each individual, for each firm they worked for in each year. Crucially for our purposes,
the MEF also contains a unique employer identification number (EIN) for each W-2
earnings record. Because MEF is a population sample and has EIN records for each job
of each worker, we can use worker side information to construct firm-level variables.
In particular, we assign all workers who received wage earnings from the same EIN in
a given year to that firm. The fact that a worker can hold multiple jobs and/or can
transition from one job to another in a given year creates some complications in this
assignment procedure, which we deal with as explained in Appendix A. The resulting
matched employer-employee data set contains information on the wage distribution
within each firm as well as the distributions of workers by gender, age, job tenure, as
well as the total employment and wage bill by firm. We analyze the full sample of firms
in this matched data set. In the baseline sample we restrict attention to firms with
at least 10 full-time equivalent (FTE) employees in a given year, and if they are not
in the Educational Services or Public Administration industries (although results are
robust to relaxing these restrictions). We conduct robustness analyses with diﬀerent
cutoﬀ levels (from 1+ FTE to 1000+ FTE).
Turning to workers, it is both challenging to analyze the universe of all workers
given the substantial sample size and it is not necessary given that the results are
unlikely to change if we were to work with a subsample. Therefore, we select a one-
sixteenth representative sample of individuals. We select individuals into our base
sample if they have relatively strong labor market attachment, defined by earning
at least the equivalent of 40 hours per week for 13 weeks at that year’s minimum
wage. Furthermore, an individual is only included in our sample if his/her employer
is in the sample. All wage earnings observations are capped (Winsorized) at the
99.999th percentile, and all dollar values are adjusted for inflation using the Personal
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Consumption Expenditures (PCE) price index. Further details on how we process the
data are available in Appendix A.
2.2 What is a Firm?
Throughout the paper, we use Employer Identification Numbers (EINs) as the bound-
ary of a firm. Although there is no precise economic definition of a firm, the EIN
corresponds closely to what many economists consider to be the firm’s boundaries.
All employers must have an EIN, and many firms use only one EIN. Corporations, for
example, should have diﬀerent EINs for each subsidiary, but use the same EIN for all
divisions.4 Because of this, Walmart stores has only one EIN but employs over 1 mil-
lion people in more than 4,000 locations. One alternative measure of the boundaries
of the firm, as used by Barth et al. (2014), is the establishment which is a physically
distinct business location (such as an individual Walmart store). Establishments are
valuable to study, but the drivers of wage decisions may be more frequently made at
a higher level—for example, Walmart has a national salary policy with very limited
regional variation.
Indeed, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which also uses EINs to define the bound-
aries of the firm, notes that “the firm level is more consistent with the role of cor-
porations as the economic decision makers than each individual establishment”.5 In
discussing small businesses, the Census Bureau—which uses EINs, as well as other
information not available in our data set, to define firms—also notes that “most schol-
ars prefer to define small business in terms of the size of the entire company or firm,
not individual establishments”.6 Figure 1 shows that the number of firms of various
sizes in the SSA data set roughly correspond to the number of firms in the Census
data.
4See IRS Publication 1635, “Understanding Your EIN.”
5http://www.bls.gov/bdm/sizeclassqanda.htm#q3
6http://www.census.gov/econ/smallbus.html
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Figure 1 – Number of Firms, by Size
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Census numbers count the number of employees at a point in time, while the SSA numbers count the
number of FTEs over the course of a year.
2.3 Summary Statistics
We begin by providing some broad statistics on the MEF data to see how it aligns with
aggregate measures from NIPAs and the BLS. First, aggregating wages and salaries
from W-2 records over all individuals in the MEF yields a total wage bill of $6.8
trillion dollars in 2012. The corresponding figure from NIPAs is $6.9 trillion, which
is quite close.7 In fact, as shown in Figure 2, the two series track each other closely
7For this particular statistic, it is not obvious that the NIPA measure is the more accurate
one. This is because the NIPA statistic comes from BLS’s Quarterly Census of Employment and
Wages (QCEW) and although this is a comprehensive survey of employers, it covers about 97%
of employment in the US. Most notably, the QCEW excludes employment that is not covered by
the unemployment insurance system—most agricultural workers on small farms, all members of the
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year by year.8
Second, the total number of individuals in the MEF who received W-2 income in
a given year (our measure of total employment) also closely tracks total employment
in the Current Population Survey (CPS). In 2012, for example, the MEF measure
contains 153 million workers, while the CPS indicated that, on average, 142 million
individuals were employed at any given time. The diﬀerence may be largely due
to the fact that the CPS is a point-in-time estimate; if people cycle in and out of
employment, they may be missed in the CPS data but will be included in the MEF
(which is aggregate over the year). It is also possible that individuals who earned
a very small amount of money in a given year may not report themselves as being
employed in the CPS even if they did receive a W-2. Figure 3 shows total employment
in the MEF and CPS; these two series generally track each other well over time.
Third, there are 6.1 million unique EINs in the MEF in 2012; as discussed above,
we are assuming that each EIN represents a firm. This number is slightly higher than
the 5.7 million firms identified by the Census Bureau’s Statistics of U.S. Businesses
data set. In addition, as shown in Figure 4, the trends in each of these data sets
are similar over time (at least since 1988, when the Census data begins). There are
somewhat more firms in the SSA data than in the Census data in every year. This
may be due to the fact that the Census is able to aggregate some EINs up to the firms
that contain them, or because they may not count firms with very small total wage
bills.
Armed Forces, elected oﬃcials in most states, most employees of railroads, some domestic workers,
most student workers at schools, and employees of certain small nonprofit organizations. All these
employees will be included in the MEF as long as they are paid by W-2s. The definition of wage
earnings used is essentially the same as ours, with the exception that employer contributions to 401K
accounts are treated as wage income by some states and hence included in BLS measure for those
states (but are not included in our W-2 measures). See http://www.bls.gov/cew/cewfaq.htm for
details.
8One diﬀerence between the two measures comes from the recording of deferred compensation:
the NIPA measure is based on payroll data where stock options and restricted stock units (RSUs)
are reported in the year they are granted and at the current value (or the Black-Scholes value in the
case of stock options). In contrast, the MEF records the W-2 values, where RSUs are reported at
the time of vesting and stock options at the time of exercise—typically several years after they are
granted—and at the price on the vesting/exercise day. This diﬀerence can be seen in the discrepancy
in the late 1990s when the SSA measure exceeds the NIPA measure (due to the stock price boom);
the opposite pattern is seen during the Great Recession for the same reason.
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Figure 2 – Total wage bill
3
4
5
6
7
To
ta
l I
nc
om
e 
(T
rill
ion
s o
f 2
01
2 D
oll
ars
)
1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
SSA total NIPA
Total Income Over Time
Notes: SSA data includes all entries in the MEF. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
data is from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank’s FRED service, series A576RC1, “Compensation of
Employees, Received: Wage and Salary Disbursements.” All data are adjusted for inflation using the
PCE price index.
Table I reports the aggregate numbers from the MEF and the benchmarks dis-
cussed above as well as totals from the base sample used in this paper.
The remaining statistics in this section are based on the sample of the MEF that
we use for analysis in the rest of the section. In particular, this only includes full-
time workers, and restricts the analysis to firms with at least 10 FTE that are not in
public administration or educational services. The median individual in this sample
earned $33,600 in 2012, up from $28,000 (in 2012 dollars) in 1982. The median firm in
our 2012 sample contained 21 full-time equivalent employees (FTEs), but the median
individual was at a firm with 983 FTEs. These statistics, as well as others describing
the sample, are shown in Table II.
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Figure 3 – Total employment
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shows the yearly average of the monthly employment numbers in the CPS. This data is from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics Table LNS12000000.
2.4 Empirical Method
We are now ready to state the main decomposition we are interested in. Let wi,jt be
the log wage of worker i employed by firm j in period t. Consider the identity:
wi,jt ⌘ wAt +
⇥
wjt   wAt
⇤
+
⇥
wi,jt   wjt
⇤
, (1)
where wAt is the average wage earnings in the economy, and w
j
t is the average wage
earnings paid by firm j. Let Nj denote total employment in firm j (in period t, which
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Figure 4 – Total number of firms
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is suppressed). Taking the variance of both sides yields:9
JX
j=1
NjX
i
 
wi,jt   wAt
 2
=
JX
j=1
NjX
i
⇥
wjt   wAt
⇤2
+
JX
j=1
NjX
i
⇥
wi,jt   wjt
⇤2
, (2)
)Nvari(wi,jt ) =
JX
j=1
Nj
⇥
wjt   wAt
⇤2
+
JX
j=1
Njvar(wi,jt |i 2 j) (3)
Dividing both sides by N and letting Pj = Nj/N denote the employment share of
9The covariance term that should appear on the right hand side of (2),
2
PJ
j=1
PNj
i
h
wjt   wAt
i h
wi,jt   wjt
i
, is zero by construction, and is hence omitted.
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Table I – Total Values From the Data
Our
Year Statistic Benchmark MEF Sample
1982 Number of Employees 99.5 109 66.6
1982 Number of Firms . 4.85 .826
1982 Total Wage Bill 3.33 3.35 2.49
1992 Number of Employees 118 130 84.3
1992 Number of Firms 5.1 5.83 1.03
1992 Total Wage Bill 4.4 4.6 3.55
2012 Number of Employees 142 153 103
2012 Number of Firms 5.73 6.06 1.09
2012 Total Wage Bill 6.93 6.76 5.38
Notes: Number of employees benchmark is from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
data from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank’s FRED service, series A576RC1, “Compensation of
Employees, Received: Wage and Salary Disbursements.” These data are adjusted for inflation using the
PCE price index. Total employment is from the Current Population Survey (CPS)’s yearly average of
the monthly employment numbers; this data is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Table LNS12000000.
Census firms shows the total number of firms reported by the Census Bureau’s Statistics of U.S.
Businesses data set, available at http://www.census.gov/econ/susb/historical_data.html. MEF data
includes all observations in the Master Earnings File. Sample statistics are from the subset of the MEF
that we use in this paper. Restrictions are described above; this sample only includes full-time workers
in firms with at least 10 FTE that are not in public administration or educational services. Sample
values are multiplied by sixteen in order to be comparable to the population. Number of employees
and number of firms are in millions; total wage bill is in trillions of 2012 dollars.
firm j, we can write
vari(wi,jt )= varj(w
j
t)| {z }
Between-firm dispersion
+
JX
j=1
Pj⇥ vari(wi,jt |i 2 j)| {z }
Within-firm jdispersion
. (4)
This equation provides a simple way to decompose total wage dispersion in the
economy into (i) between-firm dispersion in average wages paid by each firm, and (ii)
a second component which is within-firm dispersion in pay weighted by employment
share of each firm. Computing the terms in equation (4) for two diﬀerent time periods
and diﬀerencing then provides a decomposition for the change in total variance in
terms of the changes in between-firm and within-firm dispersion terms. Below we are
going to use several decompositions that are all based on this general idea. We will
often study other measures of dispersion, such as percentile diﬀerentials, but the main
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Table II – Percentiles of various statistics from the data
Year Group Statistic 25%ile 50%ile 75%ile
1982 Firm FTE 13.5 20.3 39.7
1982 Firm Mean Wage /$1,000 17.4 26.2 37.5
1982 Firm Total Wage /$1,000 317 577 1236
1982 Indiv. Age 25 34 46
1982 Indiv. FTE at firm 71.2 659 8758
1982 Indiv. Total Wage /$1,000 14.7 28.0 47.8
1982 Indiv. Wage/Firm Avg 0.54 0.84 1.20
2012 Firm FTE 13.6 20.8 41.7
2012 Firm Mean Wage /$1,000 21.0 33.9 51.3
2012 Firm Total Wage /$1,000 394 758 1805
2012 Indiv. Age 29 41 52
2012 Indiv. FTE at firm 99.1 983 12630
2012 Indiv. Total Wage /$1,000 17.1 33.6 59.9
2012 Indiv. Wage/Firm Avg 0.50 0.80 1.18
Notes: Values indicate various percentiles for the data for individuals or firms. All dollar values are
in thousands and are adjusted for inflation using the PCE price index. Only firms and individuals in
firms with at least 10 full-time equivalent employees are included. Firm statistics are based on mean
wage at firms and are not weighted by number of employees. Only employed individuals are included
in all statistics, where employed is defined as earning the equivalent of minimum wage for 40 hours
per week in 13 weeks. Individuals and firms in public administration or educational services are not
included.
idea is the same.
A Graphical Construct for Empirical Analysis
We present the results of our analysis in the forms of graphs that can communicate
a lot information in an eﬀective way. To this end, we shall focus on the percentiles
or quantiles of various distributions. Three key variables defined above will appear in
much of the analysis, and they are: a given individual’s wage earnings, wi,jt ; average
wage earnings paid by a firm, wjt ; and finally the diﬀerence between the two variables,
wi,jt   wjt , which is, loosely speaking, the residual earnings of worker i relative to
his/her firm average wage.
It is instructive to refer to Figure 5 to explain how each line is constructed. We
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Figure 5 – High paid individuals now work at higher-paying firms, but are not higher
paid relative to their firms.
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first group all individuals who satisfy the sample selection criteria described in Section
2.1 into percentile bins on the basis of their income in 1982.10 Then we calculate the
average of log real wages (in 2012 dollars) for each percentile bin. Let Ptxy denote
this average for percentile bin xy in year t. We then repeat the same procedure for
10Although we have data going back to 1978, we start our analyses in 1982, except where otherwise
indicated, because of some minor data completeness issues in the first two years, and in order to use
data points separated by 30 years. Results are very similar if we vary the starting point for these
graphs.
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2012 (now for individuals who satisfy sample selection in that year). The blue line
marked with diamonds (labeled “Individuals”) in Figure 5 plots P2012xy   P1982xy for
all percentile groups xy = 1, 2, ..., 99, 100 against the percentile number xy on the
horizontal axis. For example, we calculate P198250 = 10.23 (corresponding to about
$27,700), whereas the comparable number in 2012 was P201250 = 10.41 (corresponding
to about $33,200). The diﬀerence of 0.18 (or 18 log points) is plotted on the graph at
the 50th percentile. Note that this measure does not use any of the panel structure
of the data; individuals in the 50th percentile in 1982 are almost certainly diﬀerent
from those in the 50th percentile in 2012.
For the red line marked with circles (labeled “Firms”), we put individuals into
percentile bins based on their own wage earnings in 1982—just as we did for the
“Individuals” line above—but for each percentile bin, we calculate the average of
the log of mean real wages at each individual’s employer (or firm). We repeat the
same procedure for 2012. For example, in 1982, individuals in the 50th percentile of
individual wages were employed in firms with average log mean real wages of 10.42
(corresponding to about $33,600); in 2012, individuals at the 50th percentile were in
firms with an average log mean real wage of 10.65 (corresponding to about $42,200).
The diﬀerence of 0.23 is plotted on the graph at the 50th percentile.
Finally, the green line marked with squares (labeled “Individual/Firm”) is based
on the residual wage measure, wi,jt   wjt . Specifically, we compute the average of
wi,jt   wjt across all workers within a percentile in each year.11 We then plot the
diﬀerence between this statistic in 1982 and 2012. For example, in 1982, individuals
in the 50th percentile of individual wages had average log wages 0.19 lower than their
firms’ mean wages (corresponding to about 82% of their firms’ mean wage). In 2012,
individuals in the 50th percentile had average log wages 0.24 lower than their firms’
mean wages (corresponding to about 79% of their firms’ mean wages). We plot the
diﬀerence of –0.05 at the 50th percentile. Note that this “Individual/Firm” line will
be mechanically equal to the diﬀerence between the “Individuals” line and the “Firms”
line.
For all these graphs, results should be interpreted similarly. A flat line indicates
11Notice that in all likelihood, the workers we average over are employed in diﬀerent firms and
each residual is computed with respect to a worker’s own employer.
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that inequality for that statistic has not changed over the time period, because the
statistic for those at the top and the bottom have changed by the same amount. An
upward-sloping line indicates that inequality has increased, because the statistic for
those at the top has increased more than the statistic for those at the bottom; and
by the same logic, a downward-sloping line indicates that inequality has decreased.
This graphical construct thus allows us to detect changes in inequality that might be
confined to one part of the wage distribution and may not be very visible in broad
inequality statistics.
Particular care should be given to the interpretation of the green “Individual/Firm”
line. The level of this line indicates the extent to which a particular demographic group
gains or loses relative to the firm average. When we examine the whole population,
or subsets of the population that, for each firm, include either everyone or no one
at that firm, the green line’s weighted average level must be near zero (except for
small diﬀerences due to, for example, Jensen’s inequality and data for individuals
who work at multiple jobs). However, the interpretation is diﬀerent when we look at
demographic subsets of the population, as in Subsection 3.2, where we examine only
a subset of each firm. For these analyses, there is no presumption that the level for
any group must have an average of zero; instead, we interpret the average level as
the extent to which the group has gained or lost relative to firm average. Next, in
addition to level, the slope of the green line indicates the extent to which inequality
has increased (if there is an upward slope) or decreased (downward slope) for the
specified subset of the population.
3 Results
Except at the very top, the highest-paid individuals now work at higher-
paying firms, but are not higher paid relative to those firms
We are now ready to discuss the first (and main) substantive finding of this paper,
shown in Figure 5. The blue “individuals” line shows the well-documented trend:
inequality in individuals’ wage earnings has increased markedly between 1982 and
2012. For example, wages in the 50th percentile increased by 18 log points in those
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three decades, while wages in the top one percent increased by an average of 66 log
points. The red line shows a similar trend for the firms in which these employees work.
Mean wages at the firms that workers in the 50th percentile worked in increased by an
average of 23 log points, while mean wages at the firms that the top one percent worked
in increased by an average of 72 log points. This indicates that 101 percent (= 72 2366 18)
of the increasing inequality for individuals is explained by rising inequality among
their firms. Meanwhile, as shown by the green “individual/firm” line, individuals
throughout the income distribution are faring similarly, relative to their firms, in
2012 as they did in 1982. Individual incomes as a fraction of mean firm incomes for
those in the 50th percentile decreased by 5 log points. Income as a fraction of the
firm’s mean income for individuals in the top one percent also decreased by the same
5 log points.
As shown in Figure 6, the increase in inequality for the top 1% of incomes is
much greater—consistent with findings from Piketty and Saez (2003) and Guvenen
et al. (2014a) who point out the increasing inequality at the top of the earnings
distribution. But, again most of this is accounted for by diﬀerences in firm level
incomes. Individuals in the top 0.01 percent in 2012 are earning 152 log points more
than in 1982. They are also at much higher-paying firms: mean income at their firms
is 136 log points higher in 2012 than the firms of the top .01 percent in 1982. These
individuals therefore now earn 17 log points more, relative to their firms, than the
top .01 percent did in 1982.
Wage dispersion between firms is increasing, while dispersion within firms
has been stable
Figure 7 conveys a similar story but using a slightly diﬀerent calculation. The blue
“Individuals” line is exactly the same as in Figure 5. However, the red “Firms” line now
just ranks firms into (weighted) percentiles by the average pay of each firm, and plots
the average change of log mean real wage in each percentile. So, for example, the 50th
percentile change of 0.23 shows that the median wage firm in 2012 pays 23 more log-
points than then median-wage firm in 1982. Finally, the green “Individual/Firm” line
first calculates the ratio of individual income to firm mean income for each individual,
18
Figure 6 – At the very top, individuals are paid more with respect to their firms
−
.
5
0
.
5
1
1.
5
Ln
 ra
tio
 o
f l
ev
el
s
99 99.2 99.4 99.6 99.8 100
Percentile
Individuals
Firms
Individual/Firm
By Individual’s Percentile: Top 1%, 1982−2012
Notes: See the notes for Figure 5.
and arranges individuals into percentiles on the basis of that statistic. In other words,
the red line shows the change in inequality between firms, without regard to where
their employees are in the income distribution; while the green line shows change in
inequality within firms, without regard to where those employees are in the absolute
distribution. We find very similar results—almost the entirety of the increase in
individual inequality can be accounted for the by the increase in cross-firm inequality.
Results are consistent within sub-periods
Figure 8 shows how the results from Figure 5 vary across time. Data values for
each graph show what values the indicated percentiles would take in Figure 5, if that
graph still began in 1982 but ended in the indicated year. Despite some variations
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Figure 7 – Increasing inequality for individuals is mirrored by inequality between
firms, but not for individuals within firms
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due to business cycles and other factors, Figure 8a shows that wage dispersion for
individuals has been gradually increasing over time, as the higher percentiles steadily
increase faster than the lower percentiles. Similarly, Figure 8b shows that mean real
wages at the firms of individuals at the top of the income distribution have increased
rapidly over time, while wages at firms of individuals lower in the income distribution
have increased less. Figure 9c, on the other hand, shows a starkly diﬀerent picture for
individuals as a fraction of their firms. This ratio has changed little over three decades
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Figure 8 – Time-Series Variation in Total-, Between-Firm, and Within-Firm Wage
Inequality
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.
for individuals at the top, middle, or bottom of the income distribution. Throughout
the last three decades, as the top-paid individuals are paid more, their coworkers have
seen similar increases.
3.1 Inequality Patterns by Firm Type
As noted earlier, the baseline analysis conducted so far is based on a sample of firms
with at least 10 FTEs. Figure 9 shows that our results are not sensitive to changes
in this threshold. When we look only at firms, and the individuals in firms, with at
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Figure 9 – Trends are similar with diﬀerent size thresholds
(a) 1+ FTE
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(b) 5+ FTE
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Notes: See the notes for Figure 5.
least 1 FTE, or at least 5, or 25, or 100 FTEs, we continue to see that workers at
the top of the income distribution are at much better-paying firms in 2012 than they
were in 1982, and earn a similar amount relative to their firms in the two years. For
each of these size restrictions, between 89 percent and 103 percent of the change in
individual income is explained by firms.
Figures 10 and 11 show that increasing dispersion between firms is not explained
by increasing dispersion between industries. Figure 10 essentially creates one of the
canonical graphs for each 4-digit SIC code, then averages the results. Thus, for
example, individuals in the 50th percentile earn around the median wage for their
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Figure 10 – Trends in Inequality, Controlling for Industry Fixed Eﬀects
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industry. As before, we then calculate the average of individuals’ wages within a
percentile; average mean wages for the firms these individuals are at; and averages
of the ratio between individual wages and mean firm wages for all individuals. As in
other analyses, individuals who are well-paid relative to their industries are now at
much higher-paying firms than individuals who are not as well compensated relative
to their industries. Meanwhile, individuals at all values of income relative to their
industries have incomes relative to their firms that are similar now to the ratios
faced by comparable individuals three decades ago. Even within 4-digit industries, 87
percent of rising inequality is explained by firms.
23
Figure 11 instead restricts the sample to firms, and the individuals at firms, in
a few broadly-defined industries. The amount of increasing inequality within each
of these industries varies, but the same trend holds in each: individuals at the top
of the income distribution, much more than those in the middle and bottom, are at
firms with higher average wages in 2012 than top individuals were in 1982; and these
high-paid individuals do not have higher wages relative to their firms now than they
did three decades ago. Within these industries, firms explain between 34 percent of
rising inequality (for Services) and 133 percent of rising inequality (for Utilities).
Figure 12 shows that similar trends hold in diﬀerent geographies across the coun-
try. These graphs each restrict the sample to firms, and individuals at firms, with
headquarters each of the four Census regions. The Northeast, South, Midwest, and
West all show the same trends described above for the national sample, with between
firms explaining between 74 percent of rising inequality (in the Midwest) and 112
percent (in the West).
3.2 Who Gains and Who Loses Within A Firm?
The fact that the overall earnings dispersion within firms did not increase does not
mean that the pay structure within firms remained static during this period. It is
entirely possible that the pay of workers of diﬀerent types (by age, gender, tenure,
etc.) shift relative to each other, even when the overall level of dispersion remains
more or less unchanged. To understand whether there might have been such changes
in the within-firm pay structure, we now investigate how the wages of workers with
diﬀerent observable characteristics changed inside a firm.
Gender Structure within A Firm
First, we examine the gender structure of pay within a firm. It is well documented
that the gender gap shrank significantly, especially during the 1980s, was relatively
stagnant in the 1990s, and shrank further in the 2000s. However, this fact alone is
not suﬃcient to know what happened within firms. It is possible, for example, that
female employment grew especially strongly in firms and industries (such as services)
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Figure 11 – Trends in Inequality, Within Selected Industries
(a) SIC: 0100 to 1799 and 9900 to 9999
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25
Figure 12 – Trends in Inequality, By US Geographical Regions
(a) Northeast
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where wages grew more strongly, generating the closing gender gap, but there was
no or little change in gender gap within each firm. In this section, we examine this
question.
Figure 13 constructs the same graphs as before but now separately for male and
female workers. The key line in each panel is the green one. It is above the zero
line and increasing with the earnings level for women, whereas the opposite pattern
(below zero and declining with earnings) is seen for men. The interpretation is that
even within each firm, especially for workers above the median wage, women gained
relative to men, and this gain has been larger the higher wage level we focus on. This
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Figure 13 – Same trends By Gender
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suggests that the gender gap has been closing within firms, particularly at higher pay
levels—so skilled employees, managers and executives female workers have seen rising
wages in particular.
The fact that women are earning more in 2012 than they were in 1982 is not new;
however, we are not aware of other research showing that they are now earning more,
relative to their firms, than they did in the 1980s. More research may be needed to
understand this fact.
Returns to Age
Next, we turn to the pay structure across age groups. Figure 14 plots our canonical
graph for four age groups: workers who are younger than 34, those aged 35 to 44,
those aged 45 to 54, and those aged 55 and up. Starting with the first group—young
workers—we see that the green line is flat near zero for percentiles below the 40th but
then slopes downward reaching –42 log points for the top 1 percent. The implication
is that highly-paid young workers have lost ground within the firm, relative to low-
paid young workers, as well as relative to the firm average. We see a similar but less
dramatic picture for the 35–44 year-old group. Here, the green line is flat between the
20th percentile and the 80th percentile, but those whose earnings were in the top 20
percent suﬀer a loss relative to the average. The 45–54 year-old group is similar and
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the group of oldest workers seem to have lost the least relative to the firm average.
Moreover, inequality within this group did not seem to decline, unlike what we have
seen for other age groups. Because of these trends, between 96 percent (for ages 45–
54) and 195 percent (for individuals under 35) of the change in inequality for these
age groups is accounted for by firms. The fact that results are stronger within age
groups may be because we are controlling for that portion of inequality that is caused
by changes in the age distribution as the population gets older. On the other hand,
we also should note that these are the only subgroups in which none of the individuals
in the sample in 1982 are in the same sample in 2012 (except a very small number of
individuals who were over 55 and working in both years).
Returns to Firm Tenure
Finally, we examine changes in income inequality among individuals with similar
levels of tenure at the same job. Figure 15 plots changes in inequality, restricting in
both years to those in their first year at a firm; those with between 2 and 4 years
of tenure at their firm; those with between 5 and 9 years of tenure; and those with
at least 10 years of tenure. These graphs use 1992 as the starting point so that we
can tell how long each individual has been at their firm. The results within these
subgroups are similar to those for the whole population. For new employees at the
50th percentile, for example, wage as a fraction of firm wage increased by 3 log
points; for new employees in the top percentile, this statistic decreased by 10 log
points. Meanwhile, for employees with at least 10 years at the same firm, wage as a
fraction of mean wage for 50th percentile individuals decreased by 2 log points; for
the top paid among these long-tenured employees, that statistic decreased by 13 log
points. Overall, between 128 percent (for those with 2 to 4 years of tenure) and 226
percent (for new employees) of rising individual inequality for these tenure groups is
explained by rising firm inequality.
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Figure 14 – Same trends By Age Groups
(a) Less than 34
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(c) Ages 45 to 54
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Notes: See the notes for Figure 5.
4 Conclusions
Most Americans earn the vast majority of their income as wages in a firm, but there is
little research attempting to understand rising income inequality within the context
of these firms. This paper attempts to bridge that gap. Firms appear to matter.
Although individuals in the top one percent in 2012 are paid much more than the top
one percent in 1982, they are now paid less, relative to their firms’ mean incomes,
than they were three decades ago. Instead of top incomes rising within firms, top-
paying firms are now paying even higher wages. This may tend to make inequality
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Figure 15 – Trends by Tenure at the Same Job
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(b) Employees with 2-4 years at the same firm
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(c) Employees with 5-9 years at the same firm
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(d) Employees with 10+ years at the same firm
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more invisible, as individuals do not see rising inequality among their peers. More
research needs to be done to understand why inequality between firms has increased
so much more than inequality within them. But this fact of stable inequality within
firms should inform our understanding of the great increase in inequality within the
United States over the last three decades.
Next steps in this research project are to undertake a more detailed analysis of
worker movement across firms following Card et al. (2013), and to use Census and
Compustat data to try to understand the movement of plant and firm level diﬀerences
in pay and productivity.
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A Appendix: Data procedures
As noted in Subsection 2.1, this paper uses data from the Social Security Adminis-
tration’s Master Earnings File. We begin with an extract from this file that includes
one observation for each year, for each individual, for each firm that this individual
worked for. (For self-employed individuals, the data set also contains these earnings
from the IRS as reported in Schedule-SE tax form by the individuals. Because our
focus is on firms with employees, we exclude these earnings from our analysis.) For
example, if Alice worked at Alpha, Inc. in 2001, 2002, and 2003, and Beta, Inc. in
2002, our file would include four observations with her information—three based on
her job at Alpha, and one based on her job at Beta. For each observation, this file
includes the year; a transformation of that individual’s Social Security Number, along
with the associated sex and date of birth; and the EIN, along with the associated
4-digit SIC code and state.
The first step we take with this data is to exclude individuals who did not have
a reasonably strong labor market attachment in a given year from the analysis for
that year. More concretely, we consider an individual to be “employed” in a given
year and include in the analysis if, summing across all jobs, he/she earns at least the
equivalent of 40 hours per week for 13 weeks at that year’s minimum wage; in 2012,
that wage would have amounted to $3,770. (We also conducted robustness checks with
other threshold levels, which show similar results.) This condition ensures that we are
focusing on data about individuals with a reasonably strong labor market attachment,
and that our results are comparable to other results in the wage inequality literature,
such as Juhn et al. (1993b) and Autor et al. (2008). The data from any individual
earning below this threshold in a given year is excluded from all results for both firms
and individuals in that year.
We then calculate statistics for each firm. To do this, we calculate the fraction of
each individual’s earnings that come from each employer in a given year; this fraction
at a given firm represents the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) employees that
work at that firm. For example, suppose that, in 2002, Alice earned $15,000 at Alpha
and $5,000 in Beta. She would then count as 0.75 of an FTE in Alpha and 0.25 of an
FTE in Beta. Using this, we calculate the total wage and total employment at each
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firm. Suppose that, in 2002, Bob earned $20,000 from Alpha (and no money from
any other firm), Carol earned $100 from Alpha (and no money from any other firm),
and no one other than Alice, Bob, or Carol earned income from Alpha. We would
exclude Carol’s earnings because she did not have a strong labor market attachment.
The total wage bill at Alpha would be $35,000 ($15,000 from Alice and $20,000 from
Bob), while total employment at Alpha would be 1.75 FTE (0.75 FTE from Alice and
1.0 FTE from Bob). Average wage at Alpha would then be calculated as $20,000 (
= $35,000/1.75 ). Next, we assign firm statistics to individuals based on the firm at
which that individual had the largest earnings. In our running example, Alice would
be assigned firm-wide statistics based on Alpha rather than Beta in 2002, because
she had more earnings at Alpha than at any other firm. Thus she would be noted as
being in a firm with total wage bill $35,000, employment of 1.75 FTE, average wage
of $20,000, and the location and industry of Alpha.
In order to analyze a representative sample of individuals in a computationally
feasible way, we analyze a one-sixteenth representative sample of all US individuals
from 1978 to 2012. The sample is organized as a longitudinal panel, in the sense
that once an individual is selected into the sample, he/she remains in the sample
until he/she dies. In particular, an individual is in our sample if the MD5 hash of
a transformation of their Social Security Number begins with a zero; because MD5
hashes are hexadecimal numbers, this will select one in sixteen individuals. MD5 is
a cryptographic algorithm that deterministically turns any string into a number that
is essentially random. It is designed so that a slightly diﬀerent input would lead to a
completely diﬀerent output in a way that is essentially impossible to predict. Because
it took cryptographic researchers several years to figure out a way that, under cer-
tain circumstances, MD5 is somewhat predictable, this algorithm is certainly random
enough for our purposes. Thus whether one individual is included in our sample is
essentially independent of whether some other individual is included, regardless of
how similar their SSNs are.
Where our results analyze the same firm over multiple years, we include a correc-
tion to ensure that firms that change EINs are not counted as exiting in one year and
entering in the next. We define an EIN in Year 1 as being the same firm as a diﬀerent
EIN in Year 2 if the following conditions are met. First, Year 1 must be the last
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year in which the original EIN appears, while Year 2 must be the first year that the
new EIN appears in our data. Next, more than half of the individuals who worked in
each firm must have also worked in the other firm. Finally, to ensure that our results
aren’t influenced by a few individuals switching companies, we only include EINs that
employ at least 10 individuals.
Firms are only included in our sample if they have at least 10 FTEs in a given
year to ensure that firm-wide statistics are meaningful; for example, comparing an
individual to the mean wage at their two-person firm may not be a good way to
characterize inequality within firms in a given year (though our results are robust
to changing this threshold, as shown in Figure 9). We also exclude firms in the
Educational Services (SIC Codes 8200 to 8299) and Public Administration (SIC Codes
9000 to 9899) industries, as employers in these industries are frequently not what we
would consider firms. Finally, we exclude employers with EINs that begin with certain
two-digit codes that are associated with Section 218 Agreements, or other issues that
may not be handled consistently in the data across years. Individuals whose primary
job is with a firm in one of these excluded categories are also dropped from the data
in that year. Thus Alice and Bob, in the example above, would not a part of any
individual-level statistics for 2002, because Alpha, the primary firm for both, did not
have at least 10 FTEs. (However, Alice’s $5,000 income at Beta, and the 0.25 FTE
she counts for there, would be included in Beta’s statistics. Excluding Alice’s earnings
and employment from Beta’s totals because Alpha is below the size threshold could in
turn force Beta below the size threshold, and then excluding Beta’s employees could
force several other firms below the size threshold. To avoid this chain reaction, we
simply include Alice in Beta’s numbers so long as her total earnings are above the
“strong labor market attachment” threshold.)
To avoid potential problems with outliers and to address privacy concerns, we
cap (Winsorize) observations above the 99.999th percentile. Winsorized variables
are firms’ total employment; firms’ total wage bill; firms’ average wage; individuals’
wage; and individual wage as a fraction of average firm wage. Variables are Winsorized
immediately before analysis. For example, suppose that Gamma, Inc. is the largest
firm in the data set, with 1 million employees and a total wage bill of $30 billion, while
the 99.999th percentile for employees is 100,000, and for total wage is $10 billion. Then
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Gamma, Inc. would be analyzed as though it had 100,000 employees and $10 billion
in wages, but average income of $30,000.
Finally, we adjust all dollar values in the data set to be equivalent to 2012 dollars
with the Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) price index12.
12http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/PCEPI/downloaddata?cid=21
36
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers 
1353 Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano 
Giovanni Peri 
Greg C. Wright 
Immigration, Trade and Productivity in 
Services: Evidence from UK Firms 
1352 Joanne Blanden 
Emelia Del Bono 
Sandra McNally 
Brigitta Rabe 
Universal Pre-School Education: The Case of 
Public Funding With Private Provision 
1351 David Atkin 
Benjamin Faber 
Marco Gonzalez-Navarro 
Retail Globalization and Household Welfare: 
Evidence from Mexico 
1350 Louis-Philippe Beland 
Richard Murphy 
Ill Communication: Technology, Distraction 
& Student Performance 
1349 Nicholas Oulton Space-Time (In)Consistency in the National 
Accounts: Causes and Cures 
1348 Gianluca Benigno 
Nathan Converse 
Luca Fornaro 
Large Capital Inflows, Sectoral Allocation 
and Economic Performance 
1347 Nitika Bagaria 
Barbara Petrongolo 
John Van Reenen 
Can Helping the Sick Hurt the Able? 
Incentives, Information and Disruption in a 
Disability-Related Welfare Reform 
1346 Mark Bryan 
Alex Bryson 
Has Performance Pay Increased Wage 
Inequality in Britain? 
1345 Christos Genakos 
Mario Pagliero 
Eleni Garbi 
When Pressure Sinks Performance: Evidence 
from Diving Competitions 
1344 David Marsden The Future of the German Industrial 
Relations Model 
1343 George Ward Is Happiness a Predictor of Election Results? 
1342 Nicholas Oulton 
Gavin Wallis 
Integrated Estimates of Capital Stocks and 
Services for the United Kingdom: 1950-2013 
1341 Camille Terrier Giving a Little Help to Girls? Evidence on 
Grade Discrimination and its Effect on 
Students' Achievement 
1340 Olivier Marie 
Ulf Zölitz 
 
'High' Achievers? Cannabis Access and 
Academic Performance 
1339 Terence C. Cheng 
Joan Costa-i-Font 
Nattavudh Powdthavee 
 
Do You Have To Win It To Fix It? A 
Longitudinal Study of Lottery Winners and 
Their Health Care Demand 
1338 Michael Amior Why are Higher Skilled Workers More 
Mobile Geographically? The Role of the Job 
Surplus 
1337 Misato Sato 
Antoine Dechezleprêtre 
Asymmetric Industrial Energy Prices  
and International Trade 
1336 Christos Genakos 
Svetoslav Danchev 
 
Evaluating the Impact of Sunday Trading 
Deregulation 
1335 Georg Graetz 
Guy Michaels 
 
Robots at Work 
1334 Claudia Steinwender The Roles of Import Competition and Export 
Opportunities for Technical Change 
1333 Javier Ortega 
Gregory Verdugo 
The Impact of Immigration on the Local 
Labor Market Outcomes of Blue Collar 
Workers: Panel Data Evidence 
1332 David Marsden Teachers and Performance Pay in 2014: First 
Results of a Survey 
The Centre for Economic Performance Publications Unit 
Tel 020 7955 7673 Fax 020 7404 0612 
Email info@cep.lse.ac.uk Web site http://cep.lse.ac.uk  
